From John KingofthePaupers Turmel@1:229/2 to All on Mon Dec 31 17:10:46 2018
[continued from previous message]
mooted and not because I couldn't convince him that coming
up with 9-times too low estimate when they had the truth was
crooked. So Phelan never adjudicated the underestimate which
we have raised again herein, he used "no MMPR so moot" as
his out. But he left the tort to continue in the next regime
while reminding us we can complain about it again.
CR: or differences in the two proceedings are such that it
would be unfair to apply the prior findings in the new
JCT: Sure it would be unfair to apply the prior findings of
a judge who wasn't aware of how they underestimated the true
average for him to a judge who will now adjudicate the 9-
times too low claim. Maybe he forgot the actual 18 gram
average when he accepted the 1-3 gram estimate.
CR: 37. The present claims should be struck both as a matter
of judicial comity and as an abuse of process. Like the
present claims, the prior Harris and Spottiswood claims
challenged the constitutionality of the prohibition on more
than four patients sharing a production site,
JCT: The sites issue isn't raised anywhere herein... but
they know it's coming.
CR: the 150 gram possession and shipping limits, and the
requirements for annual medical authorization to use
JCT: Yes, the challenges are to those two conditions.
CR: In striking the claims, Phelan J. noted that they
contained a "dearth of detail" concerning the plaintiffs'
personal circumstances and held that they failed to disclose
a reasonable cause of action.58
JCT: We gave him their MMAR Authorization Number to prove
medical need and Judge Phelan wanted to know about the
patients' medical conditions. I told him to shove it, he d
didn't need to know what they had.
But under the heading:
He held that the claims were also frivolous and vexatious
both in failing to disclose material facts and in their use
of language that was "overblown, insulting and
JCT: So it really matters if Phelan wanting to play doctor
was legit. Did he really need to see the patient's medical
records in order to accept the doctor's opinion?
CR: Lastly, he found the claims raised matters of "settled
law" concerning the medical authorization requirements,
which was an abuse of process.60
JCT: Yes, we did raise that point too that patients should
not be at the mercy of ignorant and recalcitrant doctors to
be gate-keepers for something they haven't studied. Why not
But we also raised that patients with permanent diseases
should not have to see doctors annually! So needing a doctor
is settled law right now but annually is not. The annually
was never dealt with though the doctors are gate-keepers was
dismissed as such. Notice how they mention the gate-keepers
was dismissed and then try to mislead the court into
thinking the annual doctor visits was also established law.
CR: 38. Phelan J. refused leave to amend. He noted that the
plaintiffs were given opportunities to amend their claims,
but had failed to do so. He held that a further opportunity
to amend would be "unjust" in these circumstances.61
JCT: Yes, he did give the the patients the time to strip so
he could examine them, but I held that their doctor's
opinion should be enough for him, so he was really pissed at
not getting to use his new stethoscope.
CR: 39. The Hathaway claim also raises issues that were
raised in his prior claim. The prior claim alleged that,
despite the decision in Smith, non-dried cannabis
derivatives such as juice and oil remained practically
unavailable.62 This claim was struck for failure to disclose
a reasonable cause of action and without leave to amend.63
JCT: Repetition about the Justice Zinn not seeing. But of no
consequence to my juice case under the Cannabis Act. What do
I care what some judge ruled about under Ray's ACMPR? I'm
under the new "CAR" "Cannabis Act & Regulation" with the
right to use it for recreation backing my right to use it
for medication. They've moved to strike that one too. Too
bad I'm healthy and no one who's sick has filed for the
right to get juice.
CR: 40. Judicial comity demands that the claims be struck.
The plaintiffs have identified no reasons, cogent or
otherwise, why the Court should depart from its prior
decisions. Indeed, the new claims barely acknowledge the
prior claim at all. It appears the plaintiffs have either
forgotten that their prior claims were struck, or that they
are hoping this Court will simply ignore its prior
JCT: Or that they were not dealt with because the MMPR was
struck and didn't need any more litigation. We could deal
with those torts again in the new legislation as Phelan
advised. Not our fault that Justice Phelan said that
striking the MMPR meant the "annual" beef was now gone when
they were just going to put it back again anyway. That's
what he gets for not dealing citing our issues in the
strike-down, we bring them back later.
CR: 41. The claims are also a quintessential abuse of
process. It was open to the plaintiffs to appeal the orders
striking their prior claims.
JCT: It was open to appeal against declaring the claims
mooted by the striking down of the MMPR. Something they
might do. But the Crown would have then argued it was
improper to appeal. So they know it's improper to appeal but
knock us for missing the chance to go the appeal route. More
CR: They declined to do so, but now attempt to circumvent
those orders with new claims concerning the very same
JCT: We'll have to point out that they have not cited
anywhere where the annual or 150 fraud allegation was
CR: If allowed to proceed, the claims would consume scarce
judicial and public resources on matters that have already
JCT: No, that's lawying. Where? The matters have not been
decided, they have remained undecided by the mootness by
striking down the MMPR. They keep repeating, I keep
CR: and would create a risk of inconsistent outcomes that
would undermine finality and consistency.
JCT: No risk of inconsistent outcomes when there was no
outcome the first time.
CR: 42. There is no suggestion that the prior proceedings
were tainted by fraud, that it would be unfair to apply the
prior findings in this case,
JCT: Sure, apply the prior findings when you find them to
show to the court.
CR: or that the plaintiffs have previously unavailable
JCT: The under-estimate evidence is previously unavailable
evidence and available only to Justice Phelan, not Manson.
CR: Although the Harris claim alleges that the cannabis
possession limits are based on "fraudulent" Health Canada
data,64 his prior claim included similar allegations and
Harris acknowledges that the evidence of this alleged fraud
was before Phelan J. when he struck the plaintiffs prior
JCT: Even more reason to conclude that Phelan had not
focused on the fraudulent estimate of 1-3 for an 18 gram
population which Manson had accepted. Does the Crown really
want to argue that the judge was apprised of the false
statistical surveys that duped Justice Manson and didn't do
anything to correct the mathematical error. Or did he not
bother and rely on not getting to play doctor as his out to
say he needed more evidence of their medical need than
Health Canada's medical authorization.
CR: Although the Harris claim also includes a new allegation
concerning section 15, there is no reason that the plaintiff
could not have raised this issue before. It would be a
further abuse of process if plaintiffs could re-litigate
issues simply by framing them as new causes of action.
JCT: So all we need is for one of the other 150 gram
plaintiffs to not have been a Gold Star back in 2014! Har
har har. It's not fair that some get 30 day supply so it's
not equal treatment under the law to only get 3 or 2 or 1 or
less days. And even if Harris did not argue S.15 back in
2014 when Phelan did not deal with it anyway, there are 5
more plaintiffs who were not there then and are raising the
S.15 equality right now. What's their argument not to allow
them to rely on S.15 even if they succeed in not letting
Jeff? Talk about winning something that doesn't win.
CR: 3) Courts have previously affirmed constitutionality of
the possession limits and annual medical authorization
JCT: Sure, medical authorization requirement has often been
ruled on but not the annual! That's never been ruled on.
Lots of judge have affirmed that it should be prescribed by
a doctor but no judge ever said I think it's smart that
permanently-ill patients have see their doctor every year.
CR: 43. The Harris and Spottiswood claims are contrary to
judicial comity in a second respect. This Court has
previously affirmed the constitutionality of a 150 gram
JCT: Yes, we know this court imposed the 150 gram cap and BC
Superior Court disposed of it. But those are the only two
courts who have adjudicated the issue, without the case made
against using the statistical under-estimate for the known
mean. Wish they had a citation for any courts did back
Manson's 150 gram limit. The only other court ruling on the
150-gram limit was in Garber who found that a 150 cap on
people with more than 150-gram per day was not proper. So
only 2 courts ever dealt with the 150-gram possession limit
but Allard and Garber courts.
But it does indicate that the issue is not frivolous,
vexatious or an abuse when there is a contrary ruling
elsewhere from a provincial Superior Court.
CR: and several courts, including this one, have
consistently affirmed the constitutionality of requirements
for physician authorization to use cannabis for medical
JCT: Again, physician authorization affirmed but not annual!
Har har har. Sure, we lost trying to get rid of the doctors
but Phelan did not rule on the 1-year max. It was one of
those we could raise under the ACMPR. But sure, doctors as
gatekeepers has been often affirmed no matter how wrong.
CR: The plaintiffs have identified no reason why this Court
should depart from these decisions. The claims should be
struck on this ground, as well.
JCT: We agree "doctor is needed" is affirmed but argue that
it does not carry to "therefore annual" is affirmed.
CR: a) The 150 gram possession limit
44. In Allard, this Court considered the constitutionality
of the 150 gram possession limit in the MMPR. The Court held
that the limit was constitutional. In so doing, Phelan
 ... Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the
150 gram possession restriction limits their freedom of
movement and ability to travel; that the state does not
have a legitimate interest in this prohibition; and that
it does not acknowledge those who possess it safely
without endangering others,
 I agree with the Defendant, in the section 7
analysis, that the burden is on the Plaintiffs to
establish that the 150 gram possession limit impacts
them in a significant way.
Although the Plaintiffs may have to purchase their
marihuana more frequently and restrict the number of
days they travel or transport the drug because of this
JCT: He wasn't discussing whether the 150 gram cap
genocidally undermedicated by a factor of 9, he discussed
whether it impeded travel and forced them to purchase more
frequently. Not life and death undermedication, but trivial
reasons in comparison to genocide. He wanted them to explain
how being undermedicated by a factor of 9 impacted them in a
significant way. He just couldn't estimate on his own.
Maybe Judge Phelan would have seen how the 150-gram
possession limit impacts better if one of the Plaintiffs'
had had a prescription of more than 150 grams.
the cap is not over-broad or grossly disproportionate
JCT: Not being allowed to carry even one day's prescription
doesn't seem over-broad or grossly disproportional. He was
dealing with people who had a minimum of 6 days permit @ 25.
because it bears a connection to the objective - it
reduces the implied risk of theft, violence and
diversion for which there has been no substantial or
 Overall, this restriction is significantly
different than the restriction on cultivation as the
cultivation restriction is a complete ban without
minimal impairment that affects individuals adversely to
the legislation's objective. The possession cap still
allows one to possess more than their necessary amount
JCT: It didn't under the MMAR, MMPR, ACMPR! The possession
cap supposedly allowed 200-grammer Art Jackes T-1784-18 to
get his necessary amount of marijuana in only 40 shipments a
month. Phelan's decision was "Per incuriam" in that things
that ought to have been considered obviously were not. He
was unaware that the possession cap does not "allow one to
possess more than their necessary amount of marijuana" just
because the 25-grammer did. Is less than a day's supply
"their necessary amount."
CR: 45. Harris now attempts to re-litigate this issue but
has identified no cogent reason why this Court should depart
from its decision in Allard.
JCT: A new ruling from B.C. is one good reason why this
Court should depart from its decision in Allard as well as
the new information about the statistical fraud used to
under-medicate the masses by a factor of 9.
CR: There is no suggestion that Allard failed to address
some binding case or legislation, or that subsequent cases
or legislation have undermined its validity.
JCT: Could they have missed how Garber undermined its
validity by disposing of it and imposing a more judicious
limit? But the Crown does not see.
CR: Indeed, as detailed at paragraph 31 above, subsequent
legislation has significantly expanded patients' ability to
possess cannabis. Any impact on Charter rights is even less
now than at the time of Allard.
JCT: The Cannabis Act adds the 30 grams of recreational to
the 150 grams maximum. Still does not solve Art Jackes' 200
CR: 46. The Allard decision followed a lengthy trial and was
based on a large volume of evidence, including evidence and
submissions specifically concerning the 150 gram possession
limit and its impact on patients.67
JCT: And John Conroy missed how they fraudulently lowered
the known 18 gram average to the estimated 1 to 3 gram! Har
har har. The Great Canadian Gambler caught the scam.
CR: Following the trial decision, the Allard plaintiffs
brought a motion for reconsideration of several aspects of
the decision, including the 150 gram limit.
JCT: They asked to strike both the "150 gram limit or 30x
daily dose!" The Allard Statement of Claim sought
e. A Declaration that the provisions that specifically
restrict the amounts relating to possession and storage
by patients, including the "30 x the daily quantity or
150 gram maximum, whichever is the lesser" are
CR: So Allard sought to strike the "30-day or 150 gram
maximum." Bad drafting to aim at both limits. We only seek
to strike the "150 gram maximum" only to get the "30-day
maximum" as small-dosers. Har har har har har har. Of course
they're not going to strike the 30-day maximum and never the
30-day or 150 gram max.
CR: The Court dismissed the motion, noting that the 150 gram
limit was "not accidentally omitted or overlooked" in the
trial decision but expressly considered and determined to be
JCT: No, he dismissed the motion asking for "A or B" so that
the "30x daily dose or 150 grams" was not unsound