1. Other drugs all get 30 days
2. Garber precedent get 10 days
7. "Few if any" means some.
12. Caps never argued
15. Phelan ruled "moot."
 can claim against new regime!
16. No 150-gram ruling
19. Believe Court continued with mooted issues?
21. Garber undermines 150 gram
28. Phelan not deal with under-medicated
33. Allard against "150 gram or 30x"
35. Cullen found irreparable harm
43. What different tests?
47. Harris has D.P.
51. Equal Treatment not raised by Harris before, others now
61. Other courts affirmed need for doctor, not annual
65. Spottiswood on MMAR, so Harris filed. Do they reply?
So here's the Reply of the Crown to our points:
WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS IN REPLY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
CR: A. OVERVIEW
1. Of the plaintiffs in these proceedings, only the
plaintiff in the Harris claim has opposed Canada's motion to
JCT: Only Allan Jeff Harris has opposed the motion because
he's the Lead Plaintiff.
CR: However, he has failed to address the fundamental
defects in the claims that are identified in Canada's
motion. The claims should accordingly be struck without
leave to amend.
JCT: Yes, he's sticking with the fact he is authorized for
100 grams per day and the 150 grams is as inconvenient for
him as it was for the Garber defendant. And that no court
has ever affirmed the annual doctor visits.
CR: B. THE PLAINTIFFS' PRIOR CLAIMS WERE STRUCK FOR NO CAUSE
OF ACTION AND AS FRIVOLOUS AND VEXATIOUS
2. In his response to Canada's motion, the plaintiff
acknowledges that this Court previously struck
constitutional challenges by Harris and Spottiswood to the
150 gram possession and shipping limits and annual medical
authorization requirement in the former Marihuana for
Medical Purposes Regulations ("MMPR"). He argues however
that the prior claims were dismissed as moot and never
litigated. This is a clear mischaracterization of this
Court's prior decision.
JCT: All they have to do is show us where Phelan analysed
the 150 gram limit with respect to high dosages, not to
travel and inconvenience, and can't. Since no argument was
allowed, how could be it mischaracterization to say it was
CR: 3. In striking the prior claims, Phelan J. noted first
that the MMPR had been declared invalid in Allard v Canada
("Allard") and had since been repealed and replaced by the
Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulations. He
found that the claims were therefore moot. However, Phelan
J. then proceeded to consider whether the claims should also
be struck on other grounds, and found as follows:
JCT: Without allowing any argument on it, he found:
 I need not go into great detail that the claims
disclose no reasonable cause of action. I noted that
neither the users of the Turmel Kit nor Hunt have filed
claims that contain details of their personal
circumstances and personal infringement of their rights.
These pleadings are in marked contrast to the pleadings
JCT: Justice Phelan had no right to want to see why the
doctor prescribed the medication. He had no right to insist
on playing doctor for which he was not qualified. Sure, the
Allard plaintiffs were ready to drop their pants when the
judge wanted to personally check them but we would not do
what was none of his business.
 This Court in its stay decision referred to the
"dearth of detail", the vague generalities and hyperbole
of the Turmel Kit, and the paucity of information on
personal circumstances. Nothing has changed and no party
took advantage of the opportunity provided by the Court
to amend and provide further details. It would be unjust
to allow amendments at this stage.
 Along the same lines and with respect to the
"frivolous, vexatious and abuse of process" argument,
the pleadings fail on this ground also. A pleading is
frivolous and vexatious if it is argumentative or
includes statements that are irrelevant,
incomprehensible, or inserted for colour, as if it seeks
relief that the Court clearly cannot grant (Simon v
Canada, 2011 FCA 6, 197 ACWS (3d)485).
 The pleadings, as noted above, suffer from such a
lack of specificity that it is difficult to respond or
to regulate the proceedings. Comments in the Turmel Kit
are overblown, insulting, and argumentative.3
JCT: Who cares about his opinion on issues he did not permit
to be litigated. Our point is that he did not permit
litigation even if he gave an opinion without hearing us.
CR: 4. It is clear from these statements that the
plaintiffs' prior claims were struck not only as moot but
also for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action
and as frivolous and vexatious. The plaintiff has identified
no reason why this Court should depart from those
JCT: It is also clear that they were struck without any
argument being presented. We made that point, hope Judge
Brown remembers it.
CR: C. THE HARRIS CLAIM CONCERNING PUBLIC POSSESSION AND
SHIPPING LIMITS SHOULD BE STRUCK
5, The plaintiff suggests that this Court should not follow
its trial decision in Allard concerning the
constitutionality of the 150 gram possession limit because
(1) it has been overtaken by the Garber decision of the
British Columbia Supreme Court, (2) Allard does not address
the same issues at this case, (3) the plaintiffs in Allard
sought much broader relief than is sought here, and (4) the
judge in Allard was unaware that the 150 gram possession
limit the was based on "fraudulent" Health Canada data.
These arguments mischaracterize both Allard and the present
6. First, the plaintiff suggests that Canada relies on the
Allard trial decision but fails to note the "subsequent"
Garber decision.4 Garber was issued on October 2, 2015, and
Allard was issued on February 24, 2016.5 Allard is thus
clearly the more recent decision, and as a trial decision of
this Court, it is more authoritative than the injunction
decision of another court in a matter that did not proceed
7. Second, the plaintiff suggests that Allard was not
concerned with "life and death under-medication," but only
with whether the 150 gram possession limit restricted
patients' ability to travel and forced them to purchase
cannabis more often, which the plaintiff describes as
"trivial inconveniences." This argument is puzzling in that
the plaintiffs claim relies on these same inconveniences.8
JCT: Allard did not consider the fraudulent surveys even if
we too raise the inconvenience issues herein.
CR: Moreover, the claim does not contain facts to show that
the possession limits result in under-medication in the
JCT: We do include the surveys and the quotes from there
but it's just more government shysters lawying.
CR: The Cannabis Act and Cannabis Regulations do not limit
the quantity of cannabis that the plaintiff may possess
except in a public place where he may possess up to 180
grams of dried cannabis or its non-dried equivalent.
JCT: So Jeff can't leave home with even a 2-day supply.
CR: While this may have practical implications for the
plaintiffs ability to travel, the claim does not allege that
the ability to travel is a matter of life and death, and the
plaintiff has not explained why he cannot access cannabis
while traveling via the various other methods identified in
JCT: Sure, he can alert his L.P. to mail it to where he's
going. But can can't take it there himself.
CR: 8. Third, the plaintiff suggests that the Allard claim
sought to eliminate possession limits entirely, whereas the
plaintiff seeks a much narrower 30-day possession limit.11
JCT: The Allard claim did try to strike the "30x daily or
150 gram" cap. It was overbroad.
CR: This is a mischaracterization of both claims.
JCT: Don't these lawying shysters make you want to puke?
CR: The plaintiffs prayer for relief does not request a 30-
day possession limit, but only a general declaration that
the 150 gram possession limit is unconstitutional.12
JCT: Right, it was Allard that tried to strike both.
CR: While the Allard claim sought a similar declaration,
JCT: Strike the 150 gram cap and strike the 150 gram or 30
day cap are not similar.
CR: it also requested the reinstatement of the former
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, which included a 30-
day possession limit.13
JCT: But it actually sought to strike 150 or 30x!! No matter
what else it said. x
CR: Both forms of relief were rejected in Allard, and
judicial comity favours the same result here.
JCT: Just because striking both caps was rejected in Allard
is no reason to reject striking just the one cap now.
CR: 9. Fourth, the plaintiff suggests that the judge in
Allard was unaware that the 150 gram possession limit was
based on "fraudulent" Health Canada data. 14 However, at the
time Phelan J. decided Allard, he was also seized of the
plaintiffs prior claim which included similar allegations of
fraud. Phelan J. was therefore well aware of these
allegations. He nevertheless affirmed the constitutionality
of the possession limit in Allard and proceeded to also
strike the plaintiffs prior claim.16 There is once again no
reason to depart from these decisions here.
JCT: Yes, Judge Phelan was aware of the fraudulent surveys
backing the 150 gram limit when he didn't overruled his
fellow judge. But he was just following judicial comity, it
Manson wanted to under-medicate the patients by a factor of
9, he must have had good reasons for wanting them dead. But
yes, Phelan knew about the fraud and let it stand. Nice of
the Crown to point out he too has blood on his hands.
CR: 10. The plaintiff also now suggests that the possession
limits violate section 15 of the Charter in that users of
narcotics may possess a longer supply of medication than
cannabis users. This has not been pleaded.
JCT: It has been pleaded in Paragraph 50. Guess they didn't
notice the last point in the Statement of Claim. Or they're
just lawying again.
CR: In any event, the claim contains no facts to show that
the use of cannabis as opposed to narcotics is an analogous
ground or that any distinctions drawn on this basis are
discriminatory in the proscribed sense.18 Narcotics are
subject to an entirely different regulatory regime and
several strict regulatory controls.19 The mere fact that
this regime may not include an identical limit on public
possession, in and of itself, cannot render the public
possession limits on cannabis discriminatory.
JCT: Showing that the possession limit is worse for non-
toxic cannabis than killer fentanyl does make a point
they're rather not see.
D. THE SPOTTISWOOD CLAIM CONCERNING ANNUAL MEDICAL
AUTHORIZATION SHOULD BE STRUCK
11. The plaintiff in the Spottiswood claim has not responded
to Canada's motion.
JCT: Jeff who filed the same Statement of Claim has once
they said Spottiswood had no beef since he was still under
the MMAR. Guess they didn't notice that they suggested Jeff
be dealt with Spottiswood!
CR: Although Harris suggests that his response is filed on
behalf of himself and Spottiswood,20 Spottiswood has not
indicated support for Harris' arguments.
JCT: Who cares? Jeff now speaks for those suffering the 1-
CR: In any event, the Federal Courts Rules do not permit
representation by persons other than a solicitor and
expressly require that individuals seeking to act in a
representative capacity be represented by a solicitor.21
JCT: Who cares if Jeff can't speak for Spottiswood though he
was named Lead Plaintiff for the group.
CR: Nevertheless, as Harris has recently filed a new claim
that is substantially identical to the Spottiswood claim,
Canada will address Harris' arguments relating to the
12. The plaintiff notes that the Spottiswood claim does not
challenge medical authorization requirements generally, but
only the requirement that medical authorization be renewed
annually. He suggests that courts have never addressed this
JCT: All the cases cited by the Crown only affirm the need
for a doctor, not annual need! Har har har.
CR: However, the medical authorization regimes affirmed in
prior cases have all included similar annual renewal
requirements,23 and the annual renewal requirement was
expressly and unsuccessfully challenged in R v Beren.4
JCT: And not dealt with.
CR: As noted above, the plaintiffs in the Harris and
Spottiswood claim also expressly raised the requirement for
annual renewal in their prior claims, which were struck for
no reasonable cause of action.
JCT: For being moot. Judge Phelan did not say that annual
check-ups for permanently-ill patients was necessary. Or
they'd show the citation.
CR: There is once again no reason to depart from these
decisions here, 13.
JCT: They can keep lawying all they want but they can't show
that Judge Phelan found annual check-ups for permanently-ill
patients was necessary.
CR: The plaintiff also argues that Beren "offers no
justification" for the annual renewal requirement and that
no court has "affirmed the need" for ongoing medical
JCT: No court has affirmed the need for ongoing medical
oversight! They only affirmed the need for original medical
oversight. After all, cannabis is completely non-toxic. What
kind of idiot thinks it needs ongoing oversight? Shysters!
CR: This argument fundamentally misconstrues the nature of
Charter analysis. It is incumbent on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the impugned provision violates his section
JCT: Making him do stuff that's unnecessary does violate his
CR: It is only if he demonstrates such a violation that the
onus shifts to Canada to justify the provision under section
JCT: We have shown no need for it, let Canada justify it.
CR: The Spottiswood claim contains no facts to demonstrate a
section 7 violation. The requirement to visit a health care
practitioner annually is at most an inconvenience.
JCT: If it takes away your food money, it's more than a
CR: As the British Columbia Supreme Court has recently
affirmed, while laws must allow for reasonable access to a
lawful supply of cannabis for medical purposes, section 7
does not require unrestricted access, and mere
"inconvenience does not engage s. 7."26
JCT: Making the patient waste financial resources is more
than mere inconvenience.